This paper is the first to assess operational and probabilistic externalities of oil extraction and transportation to Europe on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of realistic future oil demand-supply scenarios, of the relative relevance of import routes, of the local specificities in terms of critical passages and different burdens and impacts along import routes. The resulting externalities appear reasonable both under the assumption of high future demand and under low demand. Estimates range from 2.32 Euro in 2030 in the low demand scenario to 2.60 Euro in 2010 in the high demand scenario per ton of imported oil. 
Introduction
The most recent large scale accidents in oil sea transport (such as the Erika and Prestige accidents)
have highlighted the threats posed by oil spills to the environment, health, economy, and socioeconomic activity, particularly for a world region so dependent from oil imports as Europe. The associated externalities have been very poorly analysed in previous work and as their impact can locally be very high, there is a need to deepen the knowledge in this field. Moreover, in order to assess properly the overall damage cost associated to carrying oil into Europe, these kinds of damages must be assessed together with the damages routinely caused by this transport activity, within a consistent framework.
The externalities generated by oil transport are of two kinds. On one hand there are accidental externalities, caused by accidental oil spills, whose nature is intrinsically stochastic. On the other hand, there are operational externalities, caused by day to day operations of the ship, which do not depend upon the occurrence of any uncertain event, and by and large are generated by the discharge of polluting emissions from the ship engines 1 .
This study summarises four years of research within the EU FP6 integrated project NEEDS (New Energy Externalities Developments for Sustainability), and it is the first to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the external costs associated with importing oil into Europe, on the basis of realistic future oil demand-supply scenarios, the knowledge of the relative relevance of import routes, the local specificities in terms of critical passages, the differences in terms of burdens and environmental and socio-economic impacts along the different routes, and the development of oil spills prevention and remediation technologies and regulations.
For the first kind of externality, the perception of European citizens of the risks involved in carrying oil to Europe and the associated risk aversion are particularly important. In order to incorporate all these features into a consistent evaluation framework, one needs to develop a methodology suitable to deal with probabilistic externalities. In this perspective, we use an original approach for analyzing the risks related to oil tanker accidents. This methodology is described in Bigano et al. (2006) and briefly summarised in the next section.
1 Due to the lack of reliable data we are unable to assess externalities related to the operational discharges of small amounts of oil during cleaning operations. Ship-related oil pollution is attributed mostly to operational discharges, which have consistently overshadowed accidental discharges. However, the majority of these discharges happen either close to the mainland or within port areas and terminal stations, usually resulting in small spills that are dealt with by the local authorities and seldom reported.
For the second kind of externality, we follow the Impact Pathway Approach developed in ExternE (1995) as adopted and further refined within the NEEDS project. This yields geographically differentiated unit externality values for each pollutant, which take into account the local specificities of oil producing regions and the likely dispersion paths of air pollutants along the import routes to Europe.
Finally, the external cost associated with carrying one ton of oil in Europe in 2010, 2020 and 2030 is evaluated by attaching to each ton oil projected to be transported along the different import routes, the relevant unit external costs for both probabilistic and operational externalities. The import volumes projections are derived using an original import-export flows model developed within the project.
The resulting overall externality values from this exercise appear reasonable both under the assumption of high demand for oil in the next decades and under assumption of low demand.
Estimates range from 2.32 Euro in 2030 in the low demand scenarios to 2.60 Euro in 2010 in the high demand scenario per ton of oil transported to Europe.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section illustrates the methodology and the main results of the probabilistic externalities assessment. Section 3 describes the methodology and the results of our unit operational externality evaluations. Section 4 describes how these two kinds of externalities have been brought together to arrive to an overall assessment of the future externalities connected to importing one ton of oil into Europe in the coming decades. 4
Probabilistic externalities of oil transportation by tanker route
The main methodology for probabilistic externalities assessment including risk aversion has been described in detail in Bigano et al (2006) . The reader is referred to that paper for the details of our approach. In a nutshell the methodology adopted involves the following steps:
• identify the possible causes of an oil spill;
• evaluate the probabilities related to these types of accidents;
• monetize probabilistic externalities;
• introduce risk aversion and lay risk assessment in a theoretically sound and empirically founded framework.
The main motivation for applying this methodology is the inadequacy of the traditional approach (Expert Expected Damage EED). This approach estimates damages by simply monetising expected consequences, relying on expert judgements about both the probability of consequences and their magnitude. This approach disregards three fundamental traits of human behaviour when confronted with situations involving the risk of catastrophic accidents. On one hand, people need more money to compensate them for taking risks than the actuarial value of these risks (risk aversion). On the other hand, when confronted with the perspective of being potentially affected by the consequences of a negative event, people naturally adopt an ex-ante perspective, rather than the ex-post perspective implicit in standard externality evaluation. Finally, the public and the experts usually do not share the same information set. This influences the perception of the relevant probabilities.
Hence subjective probabilities held by the public are in general different from probabilities assessed by the experts (lay vs. expert probabilities). Unless these issues are addressed, the sum of money estimated as the damage will not match the amount needed to make whole those potentially harmed.
Accidental oil spills from a tanker can be caused by a limited number of accidental event.. The most likely causes of accidental oil spills are grounding and ship to ship collision. Fire and explosion used to be significant causes of accident. Their importance is now negligible, due to recent changes in unloading regulations that prevent the formation of explosive gas mixtures in the hull. Structural failures, foundering and loading-unloading errors can also cause sizeable spills; in these cases the human element, which can play a role also in case of grounding and collision, is particularly important.
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Our study focuses on groundings, collisions and structural failure & foundering as these are the most relevant causes of accidents For each cause of accident the probability that an accident of such kind happens and oil is actually spilt, are determined applying the Fault Tree Analysis methodology. The Fault Trees were constructed to show the possible accident trajectory of opportunity which could lead to an oil spill, and standard probabilities were attributed to the initiator events. These were then combined using Boolean algebra techniques. The fault trees contains elements which are site specific and elements which are independent on the location, i.e. they could happen anywhere along the route. The probabilities associated with the elements dependent on the location are then multiplied by sitespecific weightings to give the relative site probability of this accident trajectory of opportunity.
Weighting factors are based on the physical characteristics, preventive measures taken and level of spill preparedness of the location 2 . This allows us to determine the probability that oil is spilt, given that grounding or a collision or a structural failure has occurred, and the probability that different amounts of oil are spilt given that oil is lost.
The probabilities of two scenarios are computed:
• the spill occurs and its size is the average one for that kind of accident and
• the spill occurs, is exceptional and 90% of cargo is lost ("Worst Case Scenario").
For probabilistic externality evaluation, we group the oil tanker traffic into three main routes: (a) the Novorossisk-Augusta route which we take as representative of the oil transport from the Black sea to Mediterranean Route, (b) the Ras Tanura-Rotterdam route which captures the traffic from the Persian Gulf to Northern Europe, and (c) the Promorsk/Mongstad -Rotterdam route which captures the Baltic/North Sea traffic to Europe. Along these routes particularly sensitive passages (hotspots) have been identified on the basis of the exposure to accident risk and the environmental/cultural value of the area. The routes and the critical passages are highlighted in Figure 1 and . Figure 2. 2 For structural failure, time is also taken into account. 
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In the following tables the weightings (Table 1 and Table 2 ) and the probabilities (Table 3 and In order to monetize the external impacts, we consider three main categories of burdens of accidental oil spills: tourism, fisheries and natural environment. The steps followed in order to compute the monetary impacts are illustrated in Figure 3 . For Stages 1 and 2, the following assumptions were made: we assumed three possible spill sizes, two for the average spill scenario according to whether it occurs in the open sea or in a harbour, and one for the worst case scenario, independent of the location of the spill. For Stage 3, we assume that population and workforce at the hotspots are evenly spread across each hotspot's administrative region, that tourism and fisheries will stop activities for a year (11 months) if affected and that the impacts will be more severe in the proximity of the spill. The latter assumption captures the observations that usually the degree of severity of an oil spill decreases with the distance from the oil spill site and that risk aversion have a higher impact on those more intensely affected by an accident. The area around the oil spill has thus been divided into three sub-11 areas, with increasing population and decreasing severity of the impacts, according to the assumptions specified in Table 6 and illustrated in Figure 4 .
Land area Impact groups % involved % of oil spill impact The income likely to be lost has been derived from the sectoral GDP in 2004 of fisheries and tourism in the administrative regions around the hotspots. It is assumed, in order to avoid unreasonably high risk premiums that the sectors will never lose their full annual income, but will be able to count on at least one month's worth of financial resources. Moreover, sectoral GDPs are scaled down from the administrative region level to the level of the areas affected by the spill assuming that workers are distributed evenly in the region and then using the ratio of the workers of the sectors under scrutiny in the affected area to the total workers of that sector in that administrative region.
For environmental impacts, we have used the Belgian Coast CV study by Van Bierveliet et al (2005) , as it is the only valuation study in Europe (except the Blücher study in Norway, which is based on a small sample and a very local spill). The Belgian Coast CV study was based on the Exxon Valdez study (Carson et al 1992 (Carson et al , 2003 which is the prototype study that satisfies the NOAA Panel guidelines for CV studies (Arrow et al 1993) , and which also satisfies the requirements listed in Söderqvist and Soutukorva (2006) . As both of these are national studies, the WTP from these studies will probably be a lower estimate of WTP among a more affected regional population.
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However, Belgium is a small country, and therefore there might not be a large difference between the regional and national WTP. Therefore, we will base the benefit transfer exercise on the Belgian
Coast study, but we also look at the Exxon Valdez study as a consistency check.
Since there are too few CV studies of oil spills to perform a meta analysis, and since we do not have data on variables needed to perform a value function transfer (as these variables are typically not available from statistical sources at the policy site, but are typically elicited during a CV survey), unit transfer is the only available transfer method. However, since income data are available at the policy sites we perform income adjustments based on GDP measures (national GDP figures, or regional GDP figures where these are available and the affected population is determined to be regional rather than national). Even though WTP is determined by many factors, a recent meta present value) to avoid the described natural resource injuries in these two original CV studies are presented in Table 7 and The WTP (in 2007-Euros) from these two CV studies are very close. This can be viewed as a consistency check (although the damages valued are not directly comparable). We will base our benefit transfer exercise on the result from the Belgian Coast CV study, i.e. 130 euro per household for medium size oil spills (both in open sea and in the harbour), and 158 euro per household for worst case grounding scenario (both in the open sea and harbour). We do not distinguish between WTP to avoid oil spills in the open sea versus the harbour area, as the CV studies on oil spills (see Table 1 ) are so few that it is not defensible to distinguish between these two scenarios in terms of environmental damage assessment. However, we do distinguish between WTP to avoid medium and large (worst case) oil spills, but recognize that the CV literature does not support an increase in WTP proportionally to the oil spill size. The Belgian Coast CV study shows a 22 % increase in WTP with an approximately 100 % increase in spill size from medium to large oil spills (from 26.000 to 53.000 tons of oil spilled, and about 100% increase in the described impacts).
Unit value transfer with corrections for differences in GDP/capita between Belgium (national figure; as the sample was representative for the Belgian population) and the hot spots (using national GDP figures, and regional GDP where these are available), and an income elasticity of 0.5 are estimated using equation (1) below
where WTP s is the original WTP estimate from the study site, Y s and Y p are the income levels at the study and policy site, respectively , and ß is the income elasticity of WTP for the environmental good in question. ß for different environmental goods are typically smaller than 1, and seems to be in the 0.3 -0.7 range for environmental goods in European countries (Kriström and Riera 1996; Hokby and Söderquist 2003, Bredahl Jacobsen and Hanley 2007 Based on the results from validity tests of international benefit transfer these estimates could have errors of + 40 %.
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The environmental damage costs for each of the 15 hotspots are presented in Table 9 . These estimates have been added to the economic assessment of impacts on commercial fisheries and tourism to provide an estimate of total external costs from accidental oil spills at these hotspots.
Risk premiums have been computed using a specific expected utility model, under the assumption of logarithmic utility function 9 . These computations have yielded a large amount of information, which is omitted here for economy of space 10 . In particular the risk premiums for each of the three impact groups and for each potentially affected sector (tourism, fisheries, environment) at each relevant location around a hotspot have been evaluated. The risk premiums are computed according to the probabilities of each accident cause (structural failure, collision and grounding) and according three alternative assumptions regarding accident probabilities perceptions by the public: expert evaluation, lay public's perception 20 times the experts' probabilities, and lay public's perception 100 times the experts' probabilities. Generally speaking, the highest premiums are related to the impacts in the tourist and fishery sectors, and would be required by the more exposed groups (Group 1 and 2), usually resident in Northern Europe, and they get proportionally higher the higher the probabilities assumed by the public. However, the maximum value (0.88 M€) is attained by the tourist sector in Andalucia, for grounding accidents, under the assumption of lay public's perception 100 times the experts' probabilities. This is due to the relevance of the tourist sector in the local economy. Similar values are attained in south-east England, were fisheries play a more important role. Hotspots in developing countries usually display the lowest risk premiums, due to the lower incomes at stake. For the Reader's convenience, The results for offshore and onshore oil extraction are listed in Table 11 and in Table 13 . The tables
show that the impact of air emissions of offshore oil extraction is in general lower than those of onshore oil extraction, both for the low volumes emitted and for the distance from inhabited areas. Table 14 lists the weighted average values of total externalities by pollutant. To keep our analysis as general as possible, we used a weighted average of onshore and offshore extraction externalities, were the weights in each year and in each scenario analyzed, are given by the shares in total European imports, of the various production areas for which it was possible to compute unit eternality values (Middle East, Africa, Russia, Norway, the Netherlands and United Kingdom).
Thus the results shown in 
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Oil Transportation
Oil pipeline operations can cause negative impacts through the air emissions of compressors at the pumping stations that propel the oil along the pipeline, and trough the air emissions due to the escaping of the volatile fractions of the hydrocarbons in the oil. Oil pipelines are listed in the Ecoinvent database but the fields for air emissions are empty. The only unit emissions record present in the database are heat emissions and oil spilled in the soil. Alternative LCI data for oil pipelines could not be found. However, gas pipelines work in a similar fashion, but more energy is necessary to displace gas rather than oil, since gas must be compressed first. Therefore gas pipelines' operational externalities can be considered as an upper bound for oil pipeline externalities. In particular, according to the database used by the TEAMS model, which computes well-to-hull LCI data for marine transportation 11 , on average, one ton of natural gas requires 336
Btu/mile to be moved along a pipeline; crude oil requires about 240 Btu/mile. Therefore, assuming a linear relationship between energy intensity and emissions, gas pipelines' emissions should be multiplied by a factor of 0.714 to yield approximate values for analogous emissions from oil pipelines. The resulting externalities are listed in the tables below. Externalities due to the operation of oil tankers were originally computed combining Ecoinvent and Ecosense data. The resulting externalities for 2010 caused by emissions from oil tankers operations in the regions crossed by the importing routes to Europe are listed in Table 16 and in Table 17 below. Again, externalities not related to GHG emissions vary with the different regions crossed, due to the different deposition patterns of the pollutants and hence due the different socioeconomic and environmental characteristics of the regions exposed. The average values have been computed using as weights the ratio of the lengths of the routes' legs pertaining the areas listed in the first row 11 More details on the TEAMS model can be found further in this section.
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of The resulting externality values in Table 16 for particulates and SO 2 are, however, relatively high
(1-2 orders of magnitude higher than externalities caused by other pollutants). This is most probably 12 Including the alternative northern branch Mongstad -Rotterdam.
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due to the fact that LCI data from Ecoinvent are based on data for old and existing ships. Moreover the Ecoinvent data at our disposal referred to a generic crude oil tanker, thus not distinguishing between alternative fuel/engine configurations and sizes of the ship. To overcome these problems we have resorted to an alternative source of LCI data for ships, the model TEAMS 1.3 developed by the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Rochester University, New York.
TEAMS calculates total fuel-cycle emissions and energy use for marine vessels. TEAMS captures emissions along the entire fuel pathway; however it provides emission results for each phase, including ship operation. TEAMS considers six fuel pathways: petroleum to residual oil; petroleum to conventional diesel; petroleum to low-sulphur diesel; natural gas to compressed natural gas; natural gas to Fischer-Tropsch diesel; and soybeans to bio-diesel.
TEAMS calculates total fuel-cycle emissions of three greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane) and five criteria pollutants (volatile organic compounds, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter with aerodynamic diameters of 10 micrometers or less (PM 10 ), and sulphur oxides). TEAMS also calculates total energy consumption, fossil fuel consumption, and petroleum consumption associated with each of its six fuel cycles. TEAMS can be used to study emissions from a variety of user-defined vessels, including crude oil and LNG tankers. The results shown in Table 19, Table 20 and Table 21 are based on the case of a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) of 275000 dwt, carrying 2 million barrels of oil from Ras-Tanura to Rotterdam 13 . Among the engine configurations available, the one combining a low sulphur oil main diesel engine with a conventional auxiliary diesel engine was selected as the most representative of current and future tanker configurations. The emissions per ton.km for the low sulphur oil configuration resulting from the TEAMS simulation are listed in Table 18 below 14 . Main engines using residual oil and conventional diesel are used in existing vessels, in particular in old ones, while bio-diesel is at the moment mainly a theoretical possibility.
The resulting values are much lower than those obtained from Ecoinvent data, in particular for NO x , particulates and SO 2 . 
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To sum up, it must be noted that data coverage in this domain is extensive, but not complete: in particular we could not find reliable LCI information on air emissions from oil pipelines. Moreover, some available LCI data seem to be outdated. This problem is particularly relevant for tanker transportation. In order to overcome this issue, we use a source of LCI data for oil transportation alternative to Ecoinvent by tanker, the TEAMS model. This model generates specific LCI data for marine transportation, and allows to fine-tune the characteristics of the ship under scrutiny in terms of many parameters among which the size, the engine configuration, and the length of the route.
This allows us to compute externality values for four alternative engine configurations, among which low sulphur diesel engines were selected as the most representative technology to be adopted now and in the near future. This results in operational externalities which are appreciable but not as high as those obtained from Ecoinvent LCI data.
Overall assessment of external costs for oil Imports to Europe.
The final step of our externality assessment for the oil chain entails combining the unit externality values with the scenario projections of oil production and import to Europe for the present and for selected future years, under reasonable assumptions about energy markets trends. This step was performed on the basis of oil demand and import flows scenarios developed by the Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Energie, and generated overall externality values which ranging from 2.32 Euro in 2030 in the scenario assuming low demand to 2.60 Euro in 2010 in the High demand scenario per ton of oil transported to Europe.
The unit externality values described and listed in Section 3 give an overall indication of how much external damage is caused by producing a ton of oil and by transporting it for one kilometre in the seas around Europe. However they do not yet give a precise evaluation of how much external cost is generated by bringing that ton of gas into Europe. More importantly, these values do not allow us to assess what will be the evolution of these externality costs in the future.
In order to do that, one needs to combine the unit values above with an assessment of the flows of oil produced for European consumption, and transported to Europe along the main import channels (pipelines and tanker routes) now and in the future. In principle, this can be done with varying degrees of refinement and precision. Our procedure is quite accurate but still entails some simplifying assumptions.
For one thing, "the future" enters into our analyses as three selected years: 2010, 2020 and 2030.
Moreover, we have strived to include as much dynamic elements as possible. In particular, timedependent parameters and variables in our computations are the following:
• the volumes of oil extracted and transported to Europe,
• the routes and the transportation modes used to deliver the oil to European consumers,
• the unit externality values for operational externalities 15 ,
• the weights used to compute average operational externalities for the extraction phase 16 15 We used the most updated projections produced by NEEDS project. For non GHG pollutants, we used values for average height of release derived using EcoSenseWebV1.2 -21.09.2007 (based on aggregation scheme "NEEDS_core_SIA" for Human Health Impacts, based on average meteorology -corresponding to emissions from all SNAP-Sectors). For GHG emissions external costs used are computed as Marginal Damage Costs of GHG, taken from MDC_Anthoff_V1.1 under the following assumptions: -"without equity weighting",-"average 1% trimmed", -"1% discounting". The exchange from US$ to Euro corresponds to ca. 1.35$ per €. More details can be found in . The available projections cover 2010, 2020 and 2030 for GHG emissions, and 2010 and 2020 for non-GHG emissions. For the latter, 2020 values are used for 2030 as well. 16 To keep our analysis as general as possible, we used a weighted average of onshore and offshore extraction externalities, were the weights in each year and in each scenario analyzed are given by the shares in total European However, probabilistic externalities are not allowed to vary between these years. This assumption has two main motivations. On one hand, the alternative would have involved the addition of further uncertainty to the computation. In fact, the factors which may influence future probabilistic externality values are many, spatially differentiated, and very hard to project in the future with any confidence, at the hot spot level of spatial resolution. Relevant factors, for each hot spot, include:
population size, per capita income, evolution of ecosystems, evolution of the local economy, etc.
On the other hand, the assessment of the likely influence of the upcoming trends in marine regulation and technology performed within the NEEDS project showed the presence of contrasting and counterbalancing trends, with a roughly neutral influence on the overall safety standards of the industry.
Finally, even oil flows may vary according to the assumptions one can make about the main drivers influencing international energy markets. In order to at least partially capture some of this particular source of variation, we use two alternative scenarios: one assuming a lower demand level and one assuming a higher demand level. A reference scenario has not been used in this evaluation exercise, as it is conceived as instrumental for the derivation of the other two. However it is briefly described in Section 2 to help illustrating the other scenarios.
For each of these scenarios and for each pollutant, two kind of external costs are computed. On one hand, as in the case of natural gas, operational externalities along the main import routes and at the most relevant production sites for European oil imports are computed. Their values are then averaged to yield externality values, for each pollutant, per ton of oil produced and per ton of oil imported into Europe. On the other hand, probabilistic externalities are also included using a specific methodology to be illustrated in more detail below. Finally, external costs pertaining to the two categories considered are summed up to yield an overall external cost value per ton of oil imported into Europe in the base year and in each demand scenario.
imports of the various production areas for which it was possible to compute unit eternality values (Middle East, Africa, Russia, Norway, the Netherlands and United Kingdom). Thus the results shown in Table 23 and Table 24 are based on six different sets of weights, capturing the relative relevance of the various production areas in each year and scenario. 17 Pipelines are assumed to reach European standards by 2020.
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Oil demand scenarios
The following is a summary of the main assumptions behind the three demand scenarios used in this analysis, as depicted in Guarrera and Karbuz (2007) , to which the interested reader is referred for further details.
• Compared with the Reference Scenario, in the Low Case imports would be reduced by more than 90 Mt in 2030. In the Low Case Scenario, the lesser needs for imports compared with the Reference Scenario are expected to affect routes unevenly. Indeed, imports from Africa and the Caspian region will be less pronounced. While the drop in Norwegian oil production in the Low Case Scenario will still lead to a shift towards other regions, these regions will not need to contribute as much to oil imports of the EU as in the Reference Scenario. Over 20% less crude will be needed from regions such as Africa (-21%) and Caspian (-28%), 28 while other regions such as Middle East or even Russia, who are already currently substantial EU trade partners, will see their imports less affected. Compared to the Reference Scenario, in the Low Case, imports form the Middle East are expected be reduced by 13% and imports from Russia by less than 7%.
• High Case Scenario. In this scenario, the increase in demand, and thus in imports, will lead to a supply constraint forcing EU countries to get the oil wherever they can -using the full extent of routes and pipelines available. In this scenario, the effects of growing demand would be visible as soon as 2010 due to increasing demand and unchanged production in the EU; and would therefore lead to immediate increase of imports by 5% compared to the Reference Scenario. By 2020 the increase in imports in this scenario would be as high as 8%, to reach 681 Mt in 2030 -more than 10% increase compared to the Reference Scenario. Probabilistic externalities, refer, by definition, to damages that may or may not take place in any given moment and at any given location, in this case along the oil import routes to Europe.
Therefore, any given ton of oil that reaches Europe do not need to cause any damage of this kind (actually, if it has reached Europe, it has not caused any damage!). However, in its route to Europe, it stands chances to cause damages by being spilt and not reaching its final destination. Thus the first step is to define the "probabilistic externality content" of each ton of oil imported. In our study this is done by looking at this issue in terms of expected utility loss. That is, each ton of oil reaching
Europe brings about a reduction in welfare, which is the utility losses that may be caused by accidents along the routes to Europe weighted by their probability of occurrence, and including the discomfort suffered by the affected population for being exposed to such risks.
In principle, each single kilometre along these import routes has such a risk attached, and therefore, in principle, multiple accidents could happen anywhere along these routes. The complete evaluation of the exposure of each kilometre of each import route is a daunting task, and thus we had to resort to some simplifying assumptions.
In particular we assume that a) accidents occur only at well identified "hot-spots" where oil coming from different exporting countries transits in its way to Europe, and where historical records for oil tanker accidents indicate a significant exposure to accident risk; b) that each ton of oil "collects" its bits of probabilistic externalities by passing trough the hot spots relevant for the route actually followed. Thus, for instance, oil imported from Algeria to Southern France will carry attached only its own shares of probabilistic externalities potentially occurring at the relevant hot spots in western
Mediterranean, but not those occurring, say, in the North Sea.
In practice, probabilistic externalities are allotted to the various routes by dividing their values at the relevant hotspots along that route by the volume of oil transported along that route in a given year. This is exemplified in Table 22 below, which shows the computations performed for the case of
Norwegian oil exports to Northern Europe in 2010. In Table 22 , the values in the green row are just the expected losses at the hotspots in the column headings of Table 22 , as reported in Table 10 , divided by the total volume of oil imports to Europe projected to pass trough each hotspot in 2010 in the Low demand scenario. To compute the relevant probabilistic externality values, .
Overall externality assessment
Operational externalities are evaluated in a simpler way. As far as oil transport is concerned, for each import flow in each scenario and for each pollutant, unit externality values, in terms of Euros per ton of oil transported for a kilometre, are multiplied by the relevant volume transported and distance covered. These values are then summed up and divided by the total volume of oil imported to yield the externality content of one ton oil imported to Europe. An analogous procedure is followed for oil extraction, although the computation is even simpler as in this case there are no bilateral flows to trace down, but only extracted volumes for each producing country.
The results are summarised in the tables below. Detailed externality values per pollutant have been computed, but for economy of space are summarised in terms of "non-GHG" and GHG externalities 18 . Also for economy of space, Table 23 and Table 24 illustrate only the values in the High and Low Case demand scenarios.
Total externalities appear to be quite low: both in the low and in the high demand scenario they are around 2.5 Euro per ton, in each period considered, ranging from 2. On the other hand, the very low values for pipeline transport are an indication that, most probably, transferring emission values from natural gas transportation cannot capture in satisfactory way the impacts, and therefore the external damages, caused by crude oil pipeline transportation. Note that even disregarding technical improvements in pipeline maintenance would not result in significant increases of the relevance of pipeline externalities. However, neither LCI data for oil pipelines nor 32 unit externality values for oil leakages from pipelines were available; thus the alternative given the information available at the moment is simply to leave oil pipeline externalities unaccounted for. It must also be noticed that the results depend crucially from the unit externality values used for the extraction phase. It is worth noting that using offshore values only would have resulted in a drop of extraction externalities to a few cents a ton, and into overall externalities in the range of 0.5 -0.6
Euro a ton.
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Conclusions
Our assessment covered in detail various aspect of the externalities related to the extraction and transportation of oil to Europe, in particular the dynamic features related to the foreseeable variation of oil flows and transport modes, the evolution of the burdens and impacts of operational externalities, the relative relevance of the various production areas, are 25 times higher than those expected in 2030, and this has stronger effect on the overall externality values than the differences in oil import volumes and exporting countries' shares between the two demand scenarios. Assuming that no improvements in the maintenance standards of Russian pipelines take place, the overall external costs in 2030 would reach 3.05 Euro in the Low demand scenario, and 3.25 Euro in the High demand scenario. It is not unlikely that more accurate LCA data for pipelines would have resulted in even higher, but not too high, external costs, as gas pipeline transport is quite energy intensive and the energy content per cubic meter of oil is higher than for natural gas and the majority of gas imports to Europe are transported via pipeline 20 . These values are however sensitive to the LCA and unit externality assumptions made for the various phases of the value chain; in particular, the extraction phase, appears to have a strong impact on the overall assessment.
Notwithstanding the sensitivity of these results to LCA data and to unit externality values per pollutant, it is clear that these externalities are quite low, both compared to the direct cost of oil and to the externalities generated by the use of oil as a fuel. Assuming a price of crude oil at destination of $90 a barrel, the cost of one ton equals to $660 or 447 euros 21 . The external costs of transportation then amount to about 0.6% of the cost of the product in 2010. Burning oil for electricity generation results into a much higher share of external costs over total (external + private costs). For an average European power plant burning heavy fuel oil the external costs represent on 19 Also assessed within the NEEDS Project. See Bigano et al (2007c) . External costs for oil transport are from 35% to 8 times higher (per imported ton) than those for natural gas, depending on the demand scenario considered and on whether Russian pipeline maintenance standards are updated to European standards after 2010. 20 To move one ton of oil by pipeline for one kilometre it takes about 71% of the energy needed to move the same amount of natural gas along the same distance. 21 Assuming an exchange rate of 1.476 Euro per US dollar 34 average about 45% of the total costs, while for power plant using light fuel oil in a gas turbine the share of external costs over total costs is about 24%.
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The main implication for environmental policy to be drawn from this study is that bringing oil to Europe is not the most noxious phase of the oil life cycle, as actually using oil as a fuel brings about, on average, much more serious consequences for the environment and for human health.
However, transporting oil to Europe is an activity which brings about a non negligible probability of causing very high local damages. The fact that these probabilistic externalities account for a very small fraction of the total external cost of oil transport, once weighted for their occurrence probabilities and the volume of oil transported, by no means should be used as a justification for relaxing pollution prevention and remediation standards in European waters. In fact as our analysis of probabilistic externalities has demonstrated, the impact on local populations affected can be very substantial.
22 These shares of private and external costs on total cost of electricity generation are those assessed within the European project CASES (www.feem-project.net/cases ). and reported in Bigano and Porchia (2008) .
